





INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST 
RACISM AND ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION 
AND INTOLERANCE  
 
 
POSITION PAPER No.2 
 
 
 AN EXAMINATION OF 28 GROUNDS OF 
PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION IN THE DRAFT 
INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST RACISM 













Under the Supervision of 
 




Human Rights Clinic 
School of Law, university of Texas at Austin 




Programa de Justicia Global y Derechos Humanos  
Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Los Andes  
Carrera 1 No. 18A-10, Bloque RGC, Piso 3  
Tel. (+571) 3 39 4949  











Preface .............................................................................................................................. 4 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 5 
2. The Draft Convention in Comparison with other International Instruments ........... 5 
3. The Draft Convention in Comparison with Member States’ Constitutions .............. 7 
4. Why These Grounds? ................................................................................................ 7 
4.1 Immutability ............................................................................................................ 8 
4.2 History of Violent Discrimination ............................................................................ 8 
4.3 Traditionally Marginalized Sectors ......................................................................... 9 
4.4 Discrete and Insular .............................................................................................. 10 
5. Complications and Negative Consequences of Including 28 Diverse and 
Unrelated Grounds .................................................................................................. 10 
5.1 Curtailing Political Organizing, and Public Debate................................................ 11 
5.2 Disallowing Educational Loans and Fellowships Based on Educational Level is 
Counterproductive ................................................................................................ 11 
5.3 Prohibiting Permissible and Necessary Distinctions ............................................. 12 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations ......................................................................... 13 
TABLE 1: .......................................................................................................................... 14 





The Organization of American States is discussing the adoption of an “Inter-American 
Convention against Racism and All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance” (Draft 
Convention). The University of Texas School of Law Human Rights Clinic, in partnership 
with the Observatorio de Discriminación Racial (Racial Discrimination Observatory) of the 
University of Los Andes, Colombia, has prepared the following series of papers to inform 
the negotiation process of the Draft Convention. The purpose of the papers is to further and 
strengthen the negotiation process of the Draft Convention and to facilitate the participation 
of civil society organizations.  The papers analyze particular areas of the Draft Convention 
identified as problematic.   
The first paper, drafted by Kimberly Kamienska-Hodge and John Lajzer, explains the 
benefits of a narrowly focused convention that only addresses racial discrimination, and the 
detriments of a broad scoped convention that addresses multiple forms of discrimination.  
The second paper, drafted by Sara Leuschke, examines the 28 grounds currently included in 
the Draft Convention in the context of the international community‟s approach to 
discrimination.  The first and second papers advocate for a Draft Convention focused only 
on racial discrimination.  The third paper, drafted by Juan Zarama and Héctor Herrera, 
highlights the importance of recognizing collective dimensions of discrimination, 
particularly with regard to historically marginalized groups, like indigenous peoples and 
afrodescendants, and exposes the arguments in favor of the inclusion of collective rights in 
the Draft Convention. The forth paper, drafterd by Annie Depper, surveys the collective 
claims mechanisms available in international and domestic laws, and advocates the 
inclusion of a collective claims mechanism in the Draft Convention. The fifth and final 
paper, drafted by María Laura Rojas and Camila Soto, identifies the need of the inversion 
of the burden of proof in cases of discrimination, and advocates for a broad regulation of 
the burden of proof in the Draft convention. The first, second and forth papers were written 
under the supervision of Ariel E. Dulitzky. The third and fifth papers were written under 






Article 1.1 of the Draft Inter-American Convention Against Racism and All Forms of 
Discrimination and Intolerance (Draft Convention) includes 28 different grounds upon 
which discrimination cannot be based.
1
  While this is a larger number of grounds than 
any single convention addressing discrimination has yet included, the list is 
simultaneously underinclusive and overinclusive, presents no clear basis upon which 
some grounds were included while others were not, and creates an overly complicated 
system of addressing discrimination.  Thus, the final Inter-American Convention Against 
Racism and All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance (Inter-American Convention) 
should focus on racial discrimination alone, in order to strengthen its provisions, 
eliminate internal contradictions, and create a more effective instrument. 
2. The Draft Convention in Comparison with other International 
Instruments 
Some of the international documents that include a list of discrimination grounds are: the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM), Article 2; the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), Article 1; the Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, 
“Convention of Belem Do Para” (IACVW), Article 9; the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 2; the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 2; the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Article 1; the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 2; the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (CRSR), Articles 1, 3 and 33; the International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW), Article 1; 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (ACHPR), Article 2; the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), Article 3; and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 14.  A chart comparing prohibited 
discrimination grounds can be found in Table 1. 
Comparing the Draft Convention to other instruments of its type is useful for a number of 
reasons.  Other instruments adopted in the region of the Americas point toward issues 
                                                 
 
1 As of Revision 11 prepared February 18, 2009, the proposed 28 grounds are: race, color, heritage, national or ethnic 
origin, nationality, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, language, religion, political opinions or 
opinions of any kind, social origin, socioeconomic status, educational level, migrant, refugee, repatriate, stateless, or 
internally displaced status, stigmatized infectious-contagious condition or any other mental or physical health-
related condition, genetic trait, disability, debilitating psychological condition, or any other social condition. 
OEA/Ser.G, CAJP/GT/RDI-57/07 rev. 11. 
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particular to the Americas, grounds on which discrimination is most prevalent and most 
universally objected to by the states of the region.  The Draft Convention does not 
include the grounds property, birth or other status, economic position, descent, marital 
status, pregnancy, or fortune, which are included in other international instruments 
mentioned above.  Arguably, some of the missing grounds, such as property, economic 
position, and fortune, may be included in the Draft Convention‟s “Socioeconomic 
Status.”  Descent may in some circumstances fall under the Draft Convention‟s “Ethnic 
Origin” or “Heritage.”  Creed, mentioned in the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, may fall under “Religion” in the Draft Convention.  Pregnancy could 
arguably be encompassed by the Draft Convention‟s prohibition of discrimination based 
on sex, since it affects women only, but the U.S. Supreme Court specifically denied this 
argument in General Electric v. Gilbert.
2
  In General Electric, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that denial of benefits for pregnancy-related disability was not discrimination based 
on sex. 
The Draft Convention introduces heritage, sexual orientation, gender identity and 
expression, educational level, repatriate status, stateless status, stigmatized infectious-
contagious condition or any other mental or physical health-related condition, genetic 
trait, and debilitating psychological condition.  None of these have been included in other 
conventions.   
Furthermore, we agree with Clare Roberts, Special Rapporteur on Afro-Descendant 
People of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights when he explained that the 
Inter-American Convention should go beyond the instruments already extant.  Starting 
with ICERD as a minimum, the Inter-American Convention should fill in gaps to provide 
more comprehensive protection from discrimination.
3
  
As such, the omission of ICERD‟s “descent” ground counteracts any expansion by the 
addition of new grounds. The history of Afro-Descendant people in the Americas is 
unique, remarkable, and directly connected to the racism and racial discrimination 
experienced in the region.  The elimination of racial discrimination with its roots in this 
descent is one of the primary purposes of this Draft Convention.  The Draft Convention‟s 
departure from the norm in international human rights instruments is problematic, 
particularly here, where the omission refers to a ground that is relevant to the history and 
current status of racial discrimination in this region.   
                                                 
 
2 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
3 Presentation by Dr. Clare Roberts Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons of African Descent and Racial 
Discrimination of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and President of that Commission (Presented at 
session of the Working Group held on October 20, 2005) OAS Doc. CAJP/GT/RDI-14/05 
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3. The Draft Convention in Comparison with Member States’ 
Constitutions 
Each of the member states has a non-discrimination clause in its constitution.  Some of 
them express a blanket prohibition of discrimination without enumerating grounds.
4
  
Most of the member states‟ constitutions, however, do include a list of specific grounds 
on which discrimination is prohibited.  A chart comparing the grounds included in these 
constitutions can be found in Table 2.  
The inferences drawn from this table support those indicated above with regard to other 
international instruments.  Again, the 28 grounds chosen do not accurately represent 
member states‟ constitutional protection of equality.  Though this may be a matter of 
semantics for some grounds, not all disparities can be explained by differences in 
terminology. 
The 28 grounds included in the Draft Convention prove to be a poor representation of the 
member states‟ current laws.  The Draft Convention omits grounds that one or more 
member state has included in their constitution: Place of Origin, Economic Origin, 
Origin, Philosophy, Place of Birth, Cultural Identity, Judicial Past, Physical Difference, 
Creed, Class, Handicaps, Health, Preferences, Social Condition, Marital Status, Birth, 
Birth Out of Wedlock, and Religious Origin. At the same time, the Draft Convention 
includes six grounds that no member state has addressed: Educational Level, Refugee 
Status, Repatriate Status, Stateless Status, Internally Displaced Status, and Debilitating 
Psychological Condition.   
4. Why These Grounds? 
The list of grounds included has no apparent coherent logic behind it.  The characteristics 
upon which each protected group is defined are not universally immutable.  To the 
contrary, they span the spectrum between status-based discrimination and conduct-based 
discrimination.
5
  Below is an examination of possible unifying factors for the grounds 
included in the Draft Convention.   
                                                 
 
4 Argentina, Belize, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, the United States, and Uruguay do not list 
specific grounds, and have been omitted from Table 2 for this reason. 
5 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human Rights Law and Theory, 50 WMMLR 




Often discrimination is prohibited on the basis of characteristics that are immutable and 
irrelevant to the interest affected.
6
 For example, the European Court of Human Rights 
combines two justifications for strict scrutiny protection, one of which is where those 
involved have been discriminated against based on characteristics that are “„natural‟ or 
„immutable‟ in classical terms.”
7
  Race, color, heritage (presumably), national origin, 
ethnic, origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, genetic trait, disability, and debilitating 
psychological condition all involve no choice on the part of the person suffering 
discrimination.  Even within those grounds that are immutable, some (race, color, 
heritage, et al.) are permanent and others (age, some types of disabilities
8
) are not.  
However, some other grounds, such as nationality, language, religion, political opinions, 
other opinions, migrant status, refugee status, and internally displaced status all are the 
effects of certain situations or decisions, rather than immutable characteristics of an 
individual.  Again, in this second group the mutable characteristics are not uniform in 
whether the protected person or group has the power to change them.  There is no 
consensus as to whether other grounds, such as gender identity, socioeconomic status, 
educational level, stigmatized infectious-contagious condition, or other social status are 
immutable or not, and including them is bound to be controversial and inconsistent with 
any discrimination theory.  In addition, and even if some of the grounds are mutable, 
there are important differences in how central those grounds are to the core identity of the 
individual or the group.  Voluntary changes in some of these grounds would alter the 
main personality of the person or the group. 
4.2 History of Violent Discrimination 
Some of the grounds in the Draft Convention describe persons who have experienced a 
history of violence, which is used as a common characteristic of protected groups.
9
  It is 
unclear, however, that all groups protected in the Draft Convention share a history of 
violence.  The Declaration and Plan of Action of the Third World Conference against 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (Durban 
Declaration), from which the idea of this Convention largely originated, expressly 
                                                 
 
6 Aaron Baker, Proportional, Not Strict, Scrutiny: Against a U.S. “Suspect Classifications” Model under Article 14 
ECHR in the UK, 15 AMJCL 847, 849 (2008); Heather R. James, If You Are Attractive and You Know It, Please 
Apply: Appearance Based Discrimination and Employers‟ Discretion, 42 VALULR 629, 633, 660 (2008). 
7 Oddny Mojil Arnardottir, Multidimensional equality from within: Themes from the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW 53, 62 (Dagmar Schiek and Victoria Chege, eds. 2008). 
8 See Article I, 1 of the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Persons 
with Disabilities. 
9 Baker, supra note 6, at 868, 877. 
9 
 
indicates that slavery and the slave trade are among the major sources and manifestations 
of racism and discrimination, and points out that Africans, Asians, indigenous peoples, 
and their descendants are those mainly affected by its legacy,
10 
implicating only six of the 
28 grounds (Race, Color, Heritage, National Origin, Ethnic Origin, and Migrant Status). 
The Durban Declaration further gives credence to the importance of a group‟s history of 









 which have not touched all groups listed in the Draft 
Convention.  Indeed, the Draft Convention itself makes explicit reference in the 
introduction to violence (indicating only one of the 28 grounds), and hate crimes 
(indicating only eight of the 28 grounds).
15
  These distinctions in the Draft Convention 
appear to indicate that history of violence is not the unifying explanation of the Draft 
Convention‟s chosen prohibited grounds.   
In fact, if violence were the factor common to all these grounds, it is important to note 
that the OAS has already adopted the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, which covers at least two of 
the grounds included in the Draft Convention (Gender and Sex). 
4.3 Traditionally Marginalized Sectors  
All of the 28 categories describe sectors of society that have been traditionally 
marginalized, which is at times a basis for discrimination protection.
16
  However, the 
groups identified and protected by the 28 grounds have not experienced the same kinds of 
historic marginalization.  Neither do those groups face the same type of marginalization 
today.  Their disparate histories merit different protective mechanisms, which is 
impossible in one Convention.  As mentioned earlier, the European Court of Human 
Rights combines two justifications for strict scrutiny protection, the first being 
immutability.   The second justification is having characteristics related to “group 
identities which may equally be characterised by reference to a history of social 
marginalisation and structural disadvantage.”
17
  The ECHR refers to the most prevalent 
of these as „suspect‟ discrimination grounds: gender, ethnic origin, religion, etc.
18
 
                                                 
 
10 Durban Declaration, para. 13 
11 Durban Declaration, para. 14 
12 Durban Declaration, para. 15 
13 Durban Declaration, para. 20 
14 Durban Declaration, para. 34, 39 
15 Draft Convention, Rev. 11, supra note 1, at Introduction. 
16 Cohn, Marjorie, Affirmative Action and the Equality Principle in Human Rights Treaties: United States‟ Violation of 
its International Obligations, 43 VAJIL 249, 271 (2002). 




However, victims of discrimination based on one ground may also be privileged based on 
another, and by contrast, “the claims of applicants in situations of social privilege who 
claim to be victims of discrimination meet very lenient scrutiny, as can be seen in the 
claims of companies, lawyers, and landlords.”
19
  It is the different types of historic and 
current exclusions that require different approaches in terms of possible standards of 
scrutiny and redress measures.  As written, the Draft Convention does not leave room for 
such considerations, giving all the grounds one level of protection, irrespective of the 
different social history of each group.  
4.4 Discrete and Insular
20
 
Oftentimes anti-discrimination law is defended on a theory that groups for which the 
political system alone does not afford enough power need extra protection in order to 
level the playing ground.  This is based on a conception of certain groups as “particularly 
disadvantaged and socially and politically underrepresented.”
21
  But there is no regional 
or domestic consensus that the 28 grounds cover discrete and insular groups.  For 
instance, the case law of the United States does not include gender, age, sexual 
orientation, mental retardation, or disability in this category.
22
   
5. Complications and Negative Consequences of Including 28 
Diverse and Unrelated Grounds  
The complications caused by including the 28 grounds now listed in the Draft 
Convention are manifold, and are likely to render the document too unwieldy to be 
effective.  The obligations States will need to assume in adopting this convention at this 
point would be littered with exceptions, duplications, qualifications, and contradictions. 
As Oddny Mojil Arnardottir explains in his essay on multidimensional equality, there are 
three variables (elements) to any discrimination claim: 
1. A claim of a particular type of discrimination; 
2. Based on a particular discrimination ground; and  
3. Relating to a particular type of interest. 
                                                 
 
19 Id. 
20 The phrase, “discrete and insular,” originated in the United States Supreme Court case United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), and has since been used to describe those who were likely to be victims of 
prejudice and lacked sufficient power to protect their rights in the political arena.  In the United States, discrimination 
against discrete and insular groups receives strict scrutiny and is rarely justifiable. 
21 Fellmeth, supra note 5, at 874. 
22 Baker, supra note 6, at 868. 
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Arnardottir goes on to explain that these “three influencing factors exist in interplay with 
each other and may function to support or negate the influence of each other.”
23
  Herein, 
the expansion of the Draft to cover more than “all forms of racial discrimination,” as in 
ICERD, or “racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,” as in the 
World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), creates a document that is weakened by its 
own complexity and inconsistency. In addition, it compromises its potential 




The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has articulated a crucial difference the Draft 
Convention seems to ignore.  It explains that differences in treatment in otherwise similar 
circumstances are not necessarily discriminatory.
25
  A distinction based on “reasonable 
and objective criteria” may serve a legitimate interest.
26
  This is explored below through 
examples of problematic situations that may arise from this multiplicity of grounds. 
5.1 Curtailing Political Organizing, and Public Debate  
Section xi of Article 5 of the Draft Convention prohibits “Preparing and introducing 
teaching materials, methods, or tools that portray stereotypes or preconceptions,” based 
on the 28 grounds listed in Article 1.1.  Section xi in the context of political opinions 
would effectively impede political organizing or community conversation, where 
teaching materials involving righteousness are necessarily involved.  And with regard to 
other opinions, prohibiting teaching the ways in which stereotypes or preconceptions 
express, interact, or manifest makes a full educational process impossible.  Exceptions 
would be needed to allow education to encompass the full spectrum of beliefs and 
opinions. 
5.2 Disallowing Educational Loans and Fellowships Based on Educational Level is 
Counterproductive 
Article 5(xii) of the Draft Convention bans “Denying access to public or private 
education, to fellowships, or to educational loan programs, based on any of the criteria set 
forth in Article 1.1 of this Convention.” Prohibiting the denial of access to fellowships 
and educational loans based on grounds that are not relevant to educational capability and 
                                                 
 
23 Arnardottir, supra note 7, at 58.  
24 LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
(1992), quoted in Karin Mickelson, International Human Rights Law: The Dilemma of Individual Responsibility, 4 
Crim. L. F. 557 (1993). 
25 Inter-American Court of Human Rights Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory 




goals, like race, ethnicity, color, nationality, or sex, is appropriate.  However, prohibiting 
the denial of access to fellowships and educational loans based on one‟s educational level 
precludes the provision of appropriate prerequisites for higher education programs.  In 
order to maintain a standard of progressive education that effectively places students with 
similar knowledge bases together, another exception would have to be established for this 
combination.  Additionally, limiting state-funded fellowships or educational loans to 
people under a certain age may be a reasonable reflection of the most effective use of 
state resources vis-à-vis benefits to the state and its taxpayers.
27
 
5.3 Prohibiting Permissible and Necessary Distinctions  
The right to participate in government should not be limited based on certain of the 28 
grounds, but is regularly and necessarily restricted to persons of a certain age and 
citizenship status.  In fact, Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
allows for the limitation of the right to vote on grounds of age, nationality, residence, 
language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in 
criminal proceedings.  In contrast, the Draft Convention threatens to restrict political 
rights based on inappropriate grounds as well.  
The right to work also reasonably could be limited, for instance, by one‟s education level, 
language, an infectious-contagious condition (in the healthcare field, for example), and 
debilitating psychological condition, in order to be able to perform the required tasks 
(which may include a certain knowledge base or communication with certain persons).  
Similarly, age restrictions within pension plans are a reasonable way of protecting 
employees‟ financial security by allowing sustainable business practices.
28
  Furthermore, 
it is often justifiable to base employment decisions solely on religion, for example, in 
religious schools and religious institutions.  In Board of Governors of St. Matthias 
Church v. Crizzle, the UK Employment Appeal Tribunal found that discrimination was 
justified where an applicant for a head teacher position was not a “communicant” in the 
Church of England or the Catholic Church, because duties of the position involved 
spiritual leadership.
29
   Setting insurance rates based on membership in certain age groups 
that are known to be riskier to insure may also be justifiable, in that there is not yet a 
more reasonable way to ensure business expediency in the insurance industry.
30
  In 
contrast, the use of different employment practices based on color or race is always 
arbitrary and unreasonable. 
                                                 
 
27 Baker, supra note 6, at 849. 
28 New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v. Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. [2008] Supreme Court of 
Canada 45. 
29 Baker, supra note 6, at 852-53. 
30 Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321. 
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6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
As written, the Draft Convention is unlikely to achieve the goals it sets out to accomplish.  
The Inter-American Convention should include only the grounds (i) that have a coherent 
logic, such as immutability, and (ii) that protect groups that lack societal power and that 
have also faced (and still face) a similar history of violent discrimination, social 
marginalization and exclusion.  This will make the document more coherent, more 
effective, and more likely to be widely ratified.  Thus, a convention focusing only on 




















GROUNDS PROHIBITED IN THE DRAFT CONVENTION 








































































Race              
Color              
Heritage              
National Origin              
Ethnic Origin              
Nationality              
Age              
Sex              
Sexual Orientation              
Gender Identity and 
Expression 
             
Language              
Religion              
Political Opinions               
Other Opinions              
Social Origin              
Socioeconomic Status              
Educational Level              
Migrant Status              
Refugee Status              
Repatriate Status              
Stateless Status              
Internally Displaced 
Status 
             
Stigmatized Infectious-
Contagious Condition 
             
Any Other Mental or 
Physical Health-Related 
Condition 
             
Genetic trait              
Disability              
Debilitating 
psychological condition 
             
Property              
Birth or other status              
Descent              
Economic Position              
Marital Status              
Pregnancy              
Fortune              
Association with a 
National Minority 
             




















GROUNDS PROHIBITED IN THE DRAFT CONVENTION 





































































































































































Race                          
Color                          
Heritage                          
National Origin                          
Ethnic Origin                          
Nationality                          
Age                          
Sex                          
Sexual Orientation                          
Gender Identity & 
Expression 
 






       
Language                          
Religion                          
Political Opinion                          
Other Opinions                          
Social Origin                          
Socioeconomic Status                          
Education Level                          
Migrant                           
Refugee                          
Repatriate                           
Stateless                           











       










       
Genetic Trait                          










       
Place of Origin                          
Economic Origin                          
Origin                          
Philosophy                          
Place of Birth                          
Cultural Identity                          
Judicial Past                          
Physical Difference                          
Creed                           
Class                          
Handicaps                          
Health                          
Preferences                          
Social Condition                          
Marital Status                          
Birth                          
Birth out of Wedlock                          
Religious Origin                          
 
